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PREVENTING TAM’S “PROUDEST BOAST” FROM
PROTECTING THE PROUD BOYS: A RESPONSE TO FREE
SPEECH ABSOLUTISM IN TRADEMARK LAW
ABSTRACT
Recent events, including the infamous Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville
in 2017 and the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, have brought the
First Amendment, hate speech, and the resurgence of white nationalist rhetoric
into the public eye. Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, while
much of the Western World and the United Nations worked to restrict hate
speech, the U.S. Supreme Court increasingly expanded protections for speech
and expression under the First Amendment and narrowed the exceptions under
which speech is not protected. In particular, under the near-absolutist
interpretation of the First Amendment, hate speech is protected unless it falls
within the exceedingly narrow exceptions to First Amendment protection, such
as the “fighting words” or “incitement to imminent violence” exceptions.
Critics of the absolutist approach and the protection it affords hateful and racist
speech argue that this approach to the First Amendment is inconsistent with,
and in fact denies to minorities, other constitutional guarantees, namely the
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.
Through an exploration of the evolution of the absolutist interpretation of
the First Amendment, this Comment joins that argument and seeks to further
examine the place of hate speech in First Amendment jurisprudence within the
context of federal trademark law, particularly through Matal v. Tam. In Tam,
the landmark trademark case in which the Supreme Court struck down the
disparagement clause of the Lanham Act as violative of the First Amendment,
the Court furthered its current absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment
and firmly stated that the “proudest boast” of the First Amendment is protection
for the thought that we hate. In the context of Tam, this meant that Simon Tam’s
Asian American band The Slants—which, in choosing that name, engaged in
reappropriation of the traditionally disparaging term “slant”—could obtain the
federal trademark registration for a band name that it had been denied under
the disparagement clause. However, under Tam’s holding and the holding of its
companion case, Iancu v. Brunetti, others with intentions less pure and tolerant
than reappropriation may now also obtain federal trademark registrations for
and profit from the most hateful and offensive marks.
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This Comment proposes a solution—an anti-hate speech amendment to the
Lanham Act—to the double-edged sword created by Tam and Brunetti. Under
this solution, marks that would constitute hate speech would be presumptively
barred from registration. However, the amendment would also include a
reappropriation exception by which applicants could obtain registration of an
otherwise hateful or disparaging mark by successfully demonstrating that they
are using the mark to engage in reappropriation to reclaim the disparaging
mark and empower their community.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 19, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam, a landmark
case for trademark law and the First Amendment.1 Less than two months later,
on August 11, 2017, a horde of white supremacists marched through the streets
of Charlottesville, Virginia, bearing “tiki torches, swastikas, and semi-automatic
rifles and chanting slogans like ‘White lives matter’ and ‘Jews will not replace
us!’” in the Unite the Right rally.2 At first glance, the connection between an
intellectual property decision from the Supreme Court and a white supremacist
rally may not be apparent, but the two are more closely related than they appear.
Since the rally in Charlottesville, white supremacist groups spewing hate
speech have continued to operate with increasing frequency and visibility. In
August 2018, the weekend before the first anniversary of the Charlottesville
rally, groups led by the Proud Boys, “a white nationalist fight club,” arrived in
Portland to “brawl in the name of ‘free speech.’”3 Even more recently, the
summer of 2020 “brought eerie echoes” of 2017.4 In response to the
unprecedented surge of support for the Black Lives Matter movement,5 rightwing, white-supremacist paramilitary groups rallied in communities across the
country, often with the intention of escalating their rallies to open conflict with
government officials and Black Lives Matter activists.6
Many brands, influenced by the Black Lives Matter movement, have
changed, or announced plans to change, their trademarked brand names and
logos,7 many of which have been criticized as racially insensitive since long
before the summer of 2020.8 However, from a legal standpoint, when it comes

1
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (plurality opinion); U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”).
2
Politico Mag., What Charlottesville Changed, POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.politico.
com/magazine/story/2018/08/12/charlottesville-anniversary-supremacists-protests-dc-virginia-219353.
3
Id. (quoting investigative reporter Ryan Lenz).
4
Michael Signer, Charlottesville Keeps Happening, All Over America, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/08/11/charlottesville-lessons-cities-provocations/.
5
Colleen Long, Kat Stafford & R.J. Rico, Summer of Protest: Chance for Change, but Obstacles
Exposed, AP NEWS (Sept. 6, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/9035ecdfc58d5dba755185666ac0ed6d.
6
Signer, supra note 4.
7
See Jemima McEvoy, Eskimo Pie Becomes Edy’s Pie: Here Are All the Brands that Are Changing
Racist Names and Packaging, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jemimamcevoy/2020/10/
06/eskimo-pie-becomes-edys-pie-here-are-all-the-brands-that-are-changing-racist-names-and-packaging/#252
1274956a7.
8
See, e.g., Riché Richardson, Can We Please, Finally, Get Rid of ‘Aunt Jemima’?, N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/06/24/besides-the-confederate-flag-what-other-symbols-
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to the hate speech spouted by white supremacist groups, “rigid First Amendment
doctrines [protecting hate speech] . . . can tie the hands of . . . leaders trying to
keep [citizens] safe.”9 After Tam, the First Amendment now also ties the hands
of those wishing to keep hate speech and disparagement out of the federal
trademark registry.
In Tam, the Supreme Court struck down the “disparagement clause,” a
provision of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, as a violation of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.10 The Lanham Act governs federal trademark
law in the United States, including federal trademark registration.11 Prior to Tam,
the disparagement clause barred federal registration of marks that “[c]onsist[ed]
of or comprise[ed] . . . matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.”12 Tam concerned Simon Tam’s
Portland-based dance-rock band and their quest to obtain federal trademark
registration for their band name.13 The Asian American band chose the name
“The Slants” in an effort to reclaim and reappropriate “slant”—a racial slur used
to disparage people of Asian ethnicity—by using the term in a way that would
make a social commentary on and provoke conversation about discrimination.14
Despite the band’s intent to reclaim the term for the Asian American community
through this reappropriation—a tactic minority groups commonly employ to
empower themselves and fight discrimination15—the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) denied the band’s application for federal registration twice on
the grounds that “The Slants” was disparaging to people of Asian ethnicity.16

should-go/can-we-please-finally-get-rid-of-aunt-jemima (“[A] host of products . . . [are] linked to Southern
racism. . . . It is about time for there to be some honest conversation about what is at stake in continuing to
market products . . . under [such] names as ‘Aunt Jemima.’”); Vonnie Williams, Food Brands Are Finally
Changing Their Racist Mascots–But Is It Enough?, DELISH (July 21, 2020), https://www.delish.com/food/
a33313212/food-brands-racist-mascots-logos/ (noting that, prior to 2020, “[i]n response to previous and frequent
outcries over racially charged [brand] mascots, brands ha[d] done little”).
9
Signer, supra note 4.
10
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753, 1765 (2017) (plurality opinion).
11
Id. at 1752.
12
Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
13
Sarah Jeong, Should We Be Able to Reclaim a Racist Insult—As a Registered Trademark?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/magazine/should-we-be-able-to-reclaim-a-racistinsult-as-a-registered-trademark.html?_r=0.
14
Id. (“The Slants, [Tam] said, are hardly the first rock band to reclaim ‘stigmatizing labels’ . . . : ‘I grew
up with bands like The Queers [and] Pansy Division – groups who take [slurs] and flip these assumptions on
their heads.’”).
15
Sonia K. Katyal, Commentary, Brands Behaving Badly, 109 TRADEMARK REP. 819, 820 (2019) (“[F]or
as long as the advertising industry has relied on using minorities to sell their brands, those minorities have been
reclaiming and recoding them, to excise them of their prejudicial power.”).
16
Simon Tam, First Amendment, Trademarks, and “The Slants”: Our Journey to the Supreme Court, 12
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 7, 9 (2018). To the contrary, as journalist Sarah Jeong wrote, “in [Tam’s] experience,
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Ultimately, the disparagement clause was struck down as violative of the First
Amendment, and The Slants got their federal registration.17
While there is a moral intuition that Tam saw justice done for The Slants,
and while the result was legally correct under current First Amendment
doctrine,18 much of the commentary surrounding the case has focused on the
room the decision created for hate speech in trademark law19 and alternative
ways the Court could have decided the case without voiding the disparagement
clause in its entirety.20 Further, for some, Tam constitutes one of the more recent
steps the Court has taken in its absolutist interpretation of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.21
The absolutist approach to free speech provides remarkably broad protection
for freedom of expression—including “the most hateful, offensive, illiberal, and
dangerous ideas”—to an extent that “is unusual around the world, even among
other constitutional democracies.”22 This position was affirmed in Justice
Alito’s plurality opinion in Tam by his declaration that it is a “bedrock First
Amendment principle” that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it

‘Asian-Americans generally get [the name]. . . . They think it’s funny. Sly.’ It was white people who sometimes
choked on it—but that, for Tam, was what made it such a great conversation starter.” Jeong, supra note 13.
17
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his provision . . . offends a bedrock
First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”).
18
Harvard law professor and former U.S. Supreme Court clerk Noah Feldman noted that the concept of
a right to offend, which Justice Alito’s plurality expressed, “is a contentious position in the broader culture over
what discourse should be allowed in public. But, it correctly states Supreme Court doctrine.” Noah Feldman,
Supreme Court Doesn’t Care What You Say on the Internet, BLOOMBERG: OP. (June 19, 2017, 3:20 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-06-19/supreme-court-doesn-t-care-what-you-say-on-theinternet.
19
See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 15, at 824 (“Just as it empowered individuals like Simon Tam to reclaim
and reappropriate historically derogatory terms, it also now extends protection to the most entrepreneurial of
haters, too.”); Ilhyung Lee, Tam Through the Lens of Brunetti: The Slants, Fuct, 69 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2002,
2004 (2019) (critiquing Tam’s “pronouncement of a fundamental right to register a racial epithet as a mark under
the federal trademark system”); Esther H. Sohn, Countering the “Thought We Hate” with Reappropriation Use
Under Trademark Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1729, 1730–31 (2019); Mark Conrad, Matal v. Tam—A Victory for
the Slants, A Touchdown for the Redskins, but an Ambiguous Journey for the First Amendment and Trademark
Law, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 83, 123 (2018); Tam, supra note 16, at 11; Matthew Nelles, Did the Supreme
Court Open the Floodgate to Offensive Trademarks?, THE HILL (June 20, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/the-judiciary/338570-did-the-supreme-court-open-the-floodgate-to-offensive; Feldman, supra note 18;
Jeong, supra note 13.
20
See Meaghan Annett, When Trademark Law Met Constitutional Law: How A Commercial Speech
Theory Can Save the Lanham Act, 61 B.C. L. REV. 253, 258–59 (2020).
21
Feldman, supra note 18 (discussing Tam as “display[ing] the free speech absolutism that has become
judicial orthodoxy in recent years”); Noah Feldman, You Can Trademark Whatever Words You Want Now,
BLOOMBERG: POL. & POL’Y (June 24, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-24/supreme-courtvulgar-trademark-case-is-absolute-on-free-speech.
22
Zachary S. Price, Our Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 817, 818 (2018).
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expresses ideas that offend.”23 Instead of banning speech that offends, the
absolutist approach responds that the remedy for such speech is more speech.24
This response stems from nineteenth-century English philosopher John Stuart
Mill’s “traditional rationale for freedom of speech: if we cannot socially parse
out the false information, and instead suppress what is false, we deny others the
ability to reason and learn. Additionally, suppression could potentially censor a
truth clouded in falsehood.”25 As articulated by Justice Holmes in Abrams v.
United States, this process of socially parsing out false information takes place
via the marketplace of ideas,26 in which “truth reveals itself” through discourse
and the exchange of ideas and becomes the dominant and accepted doctrine in
the society.27 Historically, however, not everyone has “bought in” to Mill’s
marketplace of ideas,28 particularly with regard to hate speech.29 Among those
who are unpersuaded are legal scholars, critical race theorists, and several
philosophers of language.30 For those who have bought into Mill’s marketplace
of ideas, recent events and developments, including “the rise of the alt-right,
protests, Charlottesville, . . . the Myanmar Genocide,”31 and the phenomenon of
23
24

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion).
Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech—The United States Versus the Rest of the World?, 53 ME. L. REV. 487, 502

(2001).
25
Spencer Bradley, Whose Market Is It Anyway? A Philosophy and Law Critique of the Supreme Court’s
Free-Speech Absolutism, 123 DICK. L. REV. 517, 533–34 (2019) (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 36
(Andrew UK Ltd. 2011) (1859)).
26
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”). The phrasing “marketplace of ideas” came into use in
the 1960s. Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160, 1161
n.3 (2015).
27
Bradley, supra note 25, at 533–34.
28
See, e.g., id. at 520 (arguing “the First Amendment entrenches and legitimizes ideas that deny others
their humanity” because Mill’s theory accords “all perspectives . . . equivalent truth value” and assumes they
can compete equally in the market but fails to recognize the power dynamics of speech that prevent equal
competition).
29
Boyle, supra note 24, at 489; see also Price, supra note 22, at 824 (pointing out that the First
Amendment currently provides “near-absolute protection” for speech, regardless of how “hateful, offensive,
indecent, or illiberal” it may be). Hate speech is a problematic category because it illustrates a “conflict between
two rights in a democratic society—freedom of speech and freedom from discrimination. . . . A society that aims
at democracy must [protect] both.” Boyle, supra note 24, at 490.
30
See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA, CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III, RICHARD DELGADO & KIMBERLÈ WILLIAMS
CRENSHAW, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
10 (1993); STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 115 (1994);
cf. The Philosopher’s Arms, Hate Speech, BBC RADIO 4, at 06:54 (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.bbc.co.uk/
programmes/b06s8bq4 (quoting philosopher Rae Langton); James Bohman & William Rehg, Jürgen Habermas,
THE STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. 3.1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/
#HabDisThe (explaining German philosopher of language Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action,
in which speech must have “sincerity, rightness, and truth” to constitute speech that could be considered actual
communication or discourse—and therefore be entitled to protection).
31
Bradley, supra note 25, at 519.
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social media,32 “have forced a reconsideration of the First Amendment’s power,
limitations, and value to society.”33 These reconsiderations lead to the question
of “whether the First Amendment, in an increasingly diverse society with
multiple group identities that have historically lacked power, is compatible with
other Constitutional guarantees and norms,”34 like the right to equal protection
under the law.35
This Comment joins the body of scholarship arguing against the protection
of hate speech under the First Amendment. As a facet of that argument, it
proposes an amendment to the Lanham Act to resolve the double-edged sword
that Tam’s holding presents: allowing federal registration for all manner of
hateful marks, regardless of whether they are intended to be used for
reappropriation. This solution includes an anti-hate speech clause prohibiting the
registration of marks that would constitute hate speech, as well as an exception
to that prohibition to allow registration of such marks when they are used to
engage in reappropriation—such as the band name “The Slants.”
To reach this solution, Part I explores the origins of First Amendment
doctrine and the narrow exceptions to its near absolute protection of speech. Part
II examines the problem of hate speech and the use of reappropriation by
minority communities as a tool to combat it. Part III outlines the essential
elements of the Lanham Act and the benefits of the federal trademark
registration framework that it provides. Part IV then discusses Matal v. Tam and
its companion case, Iancu v. Brunetti.36 Lastly, Part V presents a summary of
some of the arguments against protecting hate speech and proposes an
amendment to the Lanham Act to address the problem of hate speech in
trademark law. It then addresses the inadequacy of alternative solutions for
trademark law and, finally, arguments against banning hate speech that oppose
this Comment’s proposed amendment on a broader scale.37

32
Richard Stengel, Why America Needs a Hate Speech Law, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/29/why-america-needs-hate-speech-law/ (“The presumption has always been
that the marketplace [of ideas] would offer a level playing field. But in the age of social media, that landscape
is neither level nor fair. . . . On the Web, it’s not enough to battle falsehood with truth: the truth doesn’t always
win.”).
33
Bradley, supra note 25, at 519.
34
Id.
35
MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, at 15.
36
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
37
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss how a ban on hate speech should be designed or
function in every aspect of American life. This Comment is restricted to a consideration of what such a ban
might look like in the context of the Lanham Act.
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT

This Part first traces the evolution of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the First Amendment and its emerging absolutism amidst the historical forces
that motivated, justified, and at times, challenged the evolution of the doctrine
throughout the twentieth century. It then discusses two exceptions to First
Amendment protection of speech that the Court has articulated and continued to
limit since their respective inceptions: the fighting words exception and the
incitement to imminent violence exception.
A. It Wasn’t Always So: The Evolution of the Absolutist Interpretation of the
First Amendment
When discussing the First Amendment and its importance in American
democracy, many Americans will say it is “first for a reason.”38 While this
attributed significance is misplaced, as the First Amendment was actually the
third amendment in the original proposal for the Bill of Rights, the First
Amendment is “first in the hearts and minds . . . of most Americans. Free speech
. . . [is a] core part[] of what it means to be an American.”39 The contemporary
understanding of the First Amendment and freedom of speech emphasizes
Americans’ right to free speech, regardless of the content, value, or effect of the
speech.40 The justification for this expansive protection is the notion that
freedom of expression is an essential element of democratic self-government.41
But the First Amendment was not always understood to provide such robust
protection.42 In fact, “as a matter of judicial enforcement, the First Amendment
largely lay dormant until the late 1930s and 1940s,”43 years after the First
Amendment was incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Gitlow v. New York.44 The Court’s current
absolutist interpretation did not begin to emerge until the mid-twentieth
century45 and did not take on “its now-familiar absolutist cast . . . [until] the
1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement.”46

38

Constitutional, The First Amendment, WASH. POST, at 08:07 (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.

washingtonpost.com/podcasts/constitutional/episode-16-the-first-amendment/.
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 08:09.
See Bradley, supra note 25, at 517.
Price, supra note 22, at 818.
Constitutional, supra note 38, at 05:35.
Price, supra note 22, at 820.
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
Price, supra note 22, at 820; Constitutional, supra note 38, at 06:45.
Price, supra note 22, at 820.
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Throughout the twentieth century, the nature of First Amendment protections
for speech was largely political and was influenced and, to an extent, catalyzed
by minority groups fighting for their rights, as well as by political developments
in the United States and abroad.47
In the period immediately following World War I, the Supreme Court heard
a number of First Amendment cases involving political speech and upheld
government suppression of speech under the Espionage Act, which, among other
things, prohibited government criticism and criminalized speech that had the
potential to disrupt military duties or recruitment.48 These cases established and
explored the “clear and present danger” test, which justified the suppression of
speech when “the words used [were] used in such circumstances and [were] of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that . . . [would] bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”49 Initially, the test
was applied to uphold the suppression of (often Socialist) speech, which the
Court held would ordinarily be permissible but needed to be suppressed in
wartime to promote national security and military recruitment.50 However, the
Court also applied the test in non-wartime cases based on speech by “dangerous
and unpatriotic” speakers51 and speech that posed a threat to the State.52 This
trend of government suppression of allegedly unpatriotic expression was part of
the motivation for another wave of First Amendment cases, this time brought by
the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Between 1938 and 1946, the Jehovah’s Witnesses argued twenty-three cases
before the Supreme Court to enforce their rights, “forc[ing] the Court to define—
and ultimately to strengthen—the role of the First Amendment in the United
States.”53 Of these appearances before the Court, three cases were perhaps the
most significant in shaping First Amendment doctrine: Minersville School
47
See, e.g., id. at 820, 828–29 (noting the influence of the Civil Rights Movement and the weakening of
the Ku Klux Klan on the expansion of freedom of speech protections in the 1960s and 1970s); Constitutional,
supra note 38, at 23:00 (discussing the influence of World War II on First Amendment doctrine).
48
See Bradley, supra note 25, at 521–26.
49
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (illustrating the “clear and present danger” test with
the now iconic example of falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater).
50
See Bradley, supra note 25, at 521–26 (discussing the application of the “clear and present danger” test
to Socialist speech in wartime in Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), and to
Russian radicals in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)).
51
See id. In Abrams v. United States, however, the country was not at war, a distinction Justice Holmes
highlighted, foreshadowing the “market of ideas” rationale the Court would later apply as it moved toward
absolutism. Id. at 523 (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
52
Id. at 524–25 (discussing the conviction of a member of the Communist Party in Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
53
Constitutional, supra note 38, at 06:45.
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District v. Gobitis,54 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,55 and
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire.56
Gobitis concerned the expulsion from a public school of two siblings who,
on the basis of their religious beliefs as devout Jehovah’s Witnesses, refused to
salute the American flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance at school.57 Though
there was no explicit school policy or state law compelling participation in these
patriotic exercises,58 the siblings were expelled.59
In an 8–1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled against the siblings, holding
that it is constitutional for a public school to compel its students to say the Pledge
of Allegiance and salute the American flag in the interest of promoting national
unity and cohesion.60 The Court acknowledged the importance of religious
liberty but stated that, in some circumstances, individual liberties must give way
to measures taken to promote and preserve the very society that provides those
liberties.61
While this decision may seem surprising given current First Amendment
doctrine—and was surprising to Gobitis’s lone dissenter, Justice Stone62—it can
largely be explained by the historical context of 1940. Notably, the majority
opinion was written by Justice Frankfurter, an Austrian immigrant, against the
backdrop of World War II (and the Nazi annexation of his birthplace of
Austria).63 His opinion signaled a view of “the United States as a critical player
in stopping the spread of Nazism and fascism globally” and, accordingly, the
perspective that cultivating—or compelling—patriotism was integral to that
global goal and to American national security.64
In the three years following Gobitis, a number of developments challenged
the wisdom of the Gobitis decision. Domestically, the decision was viewed as
an endorsement of “the snuffing out of religious freedom”—at least insofar as it
pertained to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a controversial religious minority group

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
319 U.S. 624.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
Constitutional, supra note 38, at 13:45.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591.
Id. at 600.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 601–07 (Stone, J., dissenting).
Constitutional, supra note 38, at 23:00.
Id.
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that was already persecuted and experienced horrific attacks after Gobitis.65
Internationally, the United States officially entered World War II, which inspired
patriotism and fueled the persecution of the Witnesses due to their more
provocative style of proselytizing, their rejection of traditionally patriotic rituals
like saluting the American flag, and the mistaken notion that the Witnesses were
working covertly for the Nazi Party.66 However, as victory over Germany and
Japan neared, American sentiment toward tolerance changed.67 With “less
anxiety” over the war, Americans had the time “to reflect on the meaning of the
war and the meaning of the principles,” like religious liberty, for which the
United States was fighting.68 Additionally, the Supreme Court’s composition
shifted in 1941 with the addition of Justice Jackson and the promotion of Justice
Stone, the lone Gobitis dissenter, to Chief Justice.69 All of these factors further
motivated the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ search for the perfect test case to overturn
Gobitis.70
Factually, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette was nearly identical
to Gobitis, but it resulted in a drastically different holding. In the midst of World
War II, Justice Jackson’s majority opinion overruled Gobitis and emphasized
the value of voluntary patriotism as opposed to efforts to compel unity through
nationalism.71 Such efforts, he wrote, are ultimately futile, as evidenced by the
failure of “every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity . . .
to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies,” in reference to the
Nazi Party across the Atlantic.72
In addition, the Barnette decision included Justice Jackson’s now-famous
meditation on the First Amendment:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
65
Id. at 28:03 (noting more than one thousand Jehovah’s Witnesses around the United States were the
victims of violent attacks, which the ACLU in 1941 compared to the mob violence of the Ku Klux Klan in the
1920s).
66
Make No Law: The First Amendment Podcast, Fighting Words, LEGAL TALK NETWORK, at 08:55
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/make-no-law/2018/01/fighting-words/.
67
Id. at 16:10.
68
Id.
69
Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.
aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2021).
70
Constitutional, supra note 38, at 35:25.
71
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (“To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.”).
72
Id.
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confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
us.73

And yet, while the Court moved firmly toward its current absolutist position on
free speech in Barnette, when the next perceived threat to national security
presented itself in the McCarthy era and the Cold War, the Court resumed its
practice of sanctioning government suppression of Communist (or perceived-asCommunist) speech and acts.74 The principles of First Amendment absolutism,
however, remained present in the dissents in several of these cases.75 Though the
Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to the scope of First Amendment
protection were inconsistent from the 1930s to 1950s for controversial groups,76
the Court moved further toward more robust protections for expression as the
country confronted the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.77
During the Civil Rights Movement, the Court expanded protections for
speech under the First Amendment in response to the racial injustices of Jim
Crow.78 In fact, many cases that are considered foundational First Amendment
cases were also civil rights decisions, including New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan.79 These cases offered a platform upon which the Supreme Court further
developed its First Amendment jurisprudence, broadly interpreting the phrase
“to protect an open ‘interchange of ideas’”80 to mean that “the public expression
of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas themselves are offensive
to some of their hearers”81 and to require strict scrutiny when the government
imposes content-based limitations on expression.82 Since this period,
“[c]ategories of unprotected speech have shrunk down or disappeared, while the

73

Id. at 642.
Bradley, supra note 25, at 526–27. In fact, the Court expanded the clear and present danger test to
address even the potential for a government overthrow by the Communist Party. Id. at 527 (citing Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1951)).
75
Id. at 529 (referring to the dissents of Justices Black and Douglas in Dennis, 341 U.S. 494, and Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), overruled by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), respectively, in
which the two argued that the Smith Act, under which Communists and left-wing sympathizers were punished,
was unconstitutional).
76
Price, supra note 22, at 827.
77
Id. at 820.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 828.
80
Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
81
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
82
See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see infra Part IV.A.2 (explaining content
and viewpoint discrimination in the First Amendment context).
74
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category of ‘speech’ subject to First Amendment protection . . . has steadily
expanded.”83
In sum, many of the Court’s sweeping protections for speech today are the
relatively recent result of domestic and international political forces throughout
the twentieth century and, in particular, the efforts of minorities to enforce their
rights in the courts, rather than imperatives inherited from the founding period.
Additionally, as some scholars have noted, “the Court ‘supplied its most robust
interpretations of the First Amendment’ only after ‘the complete collapse of the
internal [Communist] subversion threat in the 1960s’ and substantial weakening
of the Ku Klux Klan.”84 In other words, one might argue that the Court only felt
secure in establishing such broad protections for speech once the domestic and
international threats of Socialist anti-war sentiment, seemingly unpatriotic
behavior by Jehovah’s Witnesses, Communism during the Cold War, and the
Ku Klux Klan during the Civil Rights Movement—i.e., the speech the
government wanted to suppress—were ostensibly no longer a threat. This has
resulted in broad protections for expression, subject to only a few narrow
exceptions.
B. Exceptions to First Amendment Protection
The Supreme Court has stated that “the right of free speech is not absolute
at all times and under all circumstances.”85 The narrow exceptions to First
Amendment protection include, specifically, child pornography, solicitation to
commit crimes, blackmail, perjury, plagiarism, true threats, obscenity,
defamation, fighting words, and incitement to imminent violence.86 These are
“classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”87 This section focuses on the latter
83
Price, supra note 22, at 829. During the post-World War II period, many European democracies took
legislative measures and the United Nations drafted treaties to restrict hate speech while the United States
expanded protections for nearly all categories of speech. See generally ERIK BLEICH, THE FREEDOM TO BE
RACIST? HOW THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND COMBAT RACISM 6,
20–23 (Dave McBride ed., 2011) (discussing post-World War II legislation against racist and hateful speech in
Germany, England, and France, among other European nations, as well as the United Nations’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, as reflections of the importance of both freedom of speech and freedom from
oppression, and the need to balance the two); Boyle, supra note 24, at 493–98; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response
to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 30, at 17, 27–31.
84
E.g., Price, supra note 22, at 829 (quoting Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 36 (1996)).
85
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
86
The First Five, Unprotected Speech, FREEDOM F. INSTIT. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.
freedomforuminstitute.org/2017/10/13/podcast-unprotected-speech/; see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
87
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
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two exceptions—fighting words and incitement—which illustrate the difficult
and somewhat controversial distinction the Court has attempted to draw between
speech and conduct to justify regulation of some speech.88
1. The “Fighting Words” Exception
The “fighting words” exception excludes from First Amendment protection
words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.”89 The Supreme Court first articulated the “fighting words”
doctrine in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, in which Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s
Witness, was convicted under a state statute criminalizing offensive, derisive or
annoying speech directed at a person in the public square.90 The Court upheld
the statute, explaining in dicta that “fighting words” like the ones Chaplinsky
used could legitimately be punished:91
[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality. “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in
any proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act
would raise no question under that instrument.”92

While this phrasing seems to establish a fairly broad exception to free speech
protection—which could include racist speech93—the Court implicitly focused
on drawing a speech-conduct distinction by allowing the punishment of speech
based on its characterization as a “verbal act[], rather than [on] the content of
the speech.”94 Thus, the Court’s narrow holding in Chaplinsky applied the
fighting words doctrine only to words said in a face-to-face confrontation, which
88
Price, supra note 22, at 825 (“[M]odern free expression case law thus seeks to balance two central
imperatives of democratic self-government—guaranteeing personal and public security, on the one hand, and
protecting freedom of opinion, on the other—by drawing a sharp line between expression and action, word and
deed.”). This speech-conduct distinction, however, is tenuous and difficult to draw. See BLEICH, supra note 83,
at 109; FISH, supra note 30, at 105–06, 110–11. The problems with the speech-conduct distinction are further
highlighted when considered in light of philosophy of language principles, which view speech itself,
colloquially, as “doing things with words to people.” The Philosopher’s Arms, supra note 30, at 6:47 (quoting
philosopher Rae Langton) (emphasis added).
89
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
90
Id. at 569.
91
Id. at 572–73.
92
Id. at 572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940)).
93
Make No Law, supra note 66, at 23:05 (stating the fighting words doctrine is “a particularly popular
justification for suggestions that we should ban racist or otherwise offensive speech, but . . . [i]t’s very narrow,
not nearly as broad as the case’s original language suggests”).
94
Bradley, supra note 25, at 526.

CAREY_2.2.22

2022]

2/3/2022 10:22 AM

FREE SPEECH ABSOLUTISM IN TRADEMARK LAW

623

are “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation,”95 and its applications
of the doctrine since have only further narrowed the scope.96
In particular, the Court has specified that application of the fighting words
doctrine must consider the context in which the words are used and that the
doctrine only allows the restriction or punishment of speech when the speech (1)
is directed to a particular individual, (2) is aroused or was intended to arouse an
actual violent reaction, and (3) was such that the actual addressee “would be
likely to react in an immediate, violent manner.”97 In response to the extremely
narrowing effect of this last requirement on the doctrine, Justice Blackmun
dissented, “assert[ing] that the Court merely was paying lip service to
Chaplinsky.”98
With regard to hate speech and hate crimes, courts have also refused to apply
the exception to speech that is deemed to be entwined with political ideas.99
Specifically, in Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, on
remand from the U.S. Supreme Court,100 the Illinois Supreme Court “rejected
the circuit court’s injunction against the display of swastikas in the [Nazi]
march” through the predominantly Jewish community of Skokie and refused to
apply the fighting words doctrine.101 The court limited application of the
doctrine to “words which directly cause violence . . . [and] conceptualized the
display of the swastika as a political act, divorced from the effect of the display
of the swastika in a predominantly Jewish Community.”102 The crafting of this
interpretation reflects the Illinois court’s choice that “[i]t is better [for courts] to
allow those who preach racial hate to expend their venom in rhetoric rather than
95

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
Make No Law, supra note 66, at 23:30 (“[T]he history of the fighting words doctrine is mostly a history
of Court saying that it doesn’t apply . . . .”); see Melody L. Hurdle, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing
Confusion of the Fighting Words Doctrine, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1151 (1994).
97
Hurdle, supra note 96, at 1149–53 (discussing the narrowing of the fighting words doctrine through
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (setting forth that the Court must consider the context in which the
words are said), Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (requiring that the speech be directed to a particular
individual), Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (setting forth that speech must also arouse or be intended
to arouse an immediate violent reaction), and Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (requiring a showing
that the actual addressee would be likely to have an immediate violent reaction)).
98
Id. at 1153 (citing Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
99
Bradley, supra note 25, at 531 (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
100
373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978); see also Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44
(1977) (per curiam) (holding that the Illinois Supreme Court’s affirmation of a denial of a stay of the injunction
against the National Socialist Party of America, known as the American Nazi Party, deprived the group of rights
protected by the First Amendment and that the group must either be granted immediate appellate review of an
injunction of this nature or, instead, allow the stay).
101
Bradley, supra note 25, at 531 n.119 (citing Skokie, 373 N.E.2d at 22–25).
102
Id.
96
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to be panicked into embarking on the dangerous course of permitting the
government to decide what its citizens may say and hear.”103
Similarly, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the U.S. Supreme Court found the fighting
words exception did not justify a local ordinance banning swastikas, cross
burnings, and other symbols and actions that “one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouse[] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion, or gender”104 because the ordinance “regulated
fighting words through their connection with political ideas, resulting in
viewpoint discrimination.”105
Writing for the majority in R.A.V., Justice Scalia also acknowledged but
ultimately dismissed the equal protection argument that the ordinance’s
discrimination was “justified because it [was] narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests . . . [of] ensur[ing] the basic human rights of members
of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination, including the
right of such group members to live in peace where they wish.”106
2. The “Incitement to Imminent Violence” Exception
The “incitement to imminent violence” exception to freedom of speech
protection, like the fighting words exception, is narrow in scope and application,
permitting punishment or regulation of speech that is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”107 The Court outlined this exception in Brandenburg v. Ohio when it
struck down an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute under which a Ku Klux Klan
leader had been convicted for his inflammatory words at a Klan rally.108
Continuing the speech-conduct distinction the Court had followed in
103

Collins v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff’d , 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990), invalidated by R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391. R.A.V. was
convicted of burning a cross on a Black family’s lawn. Mari J. Matsuda & Charles R. Lawrence III, Epilogue:
Burning Crosses and the R.A.V. Case, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 30, at 133 (discussing R.A.V., 505
U.S. 377). Before the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the case with an “ahistorical and acontextual” absolutist
approach, the Minnesota Supreme Court “adopted the perspective urged by critical race theorists” and upheld
the ordinance after considering the “history and context” of cross burnings. Id. at 134 (discussing In re Welfare
of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991)).
105
Bradley, supra note 25, at 531 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391).
106
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395–96; Bradley, supra note 25, at 532.
107
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
108
Id. at 445. At the Klan rally in question, Clarence Brandenburg, a Klan leader, spoke about the KKK’s
plan to march on Congress to take “revengeance” for the “suppress[ion of] the white, Caucasian race” and
advocated for the forced relocation of the “n***** . . . to Africa, [and] the Jew . . . to Israel.” Id. at 446–47; see
also Bradley, supra note 25, at 529–30 (discussing Brandenburg’s place in the evolution of free speech
jurisprudence as the Court’s next step toward absolutism).
104
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determining whether speech can be punished or regulated, the Brandenburg
Court found the Ohio statute overbroad in its failure to distinguish between, on
the one hand, mere advocacy that must be permitted and cannot be punished,
and, on the other hand, incitement to imminent lawless violence that may be
punished.109
In practice, as seen in Skokie, R.A.V., and Brandenburg, the fighting words
and incitement exceptions—and, by extension, their speech-conduct
distinction—often have the effect of permitting hate speech and hate
propaganda, which have never had staying power as an exception to the First
Amendment.110 The United States, however, is “alone among the major common
law jurisdictions in its complete tolerance of such speech.”111 Understanding
why that is the case requires a closer look at hate speech—beginning with what
it is.
II. HATE SPEECH AND THE POWER OF REAPPROPRIATION
This Part attempts to offer a working definition of hate speech for this
Comment and present perspectives on the harmful effects of hate speech. It then
introduces the concept of reappropriation as a tool by which minorities reclaim
derogatory devices to empower their communities, challenge assumptions, and
inspire meaningful conversation about discrimination.
A. Defining Hate Speech and Identifying Its Harms
Though definitions of hate speech vary somewhat, they generally relay that
hate speech consists of communication in the form of speech or expression that
targets and is hostile to particular social groups on the basis of characteristics
such as race, ethnicity, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, and
disability. The following examples offer context for considering and discussing
hate speech, as well as whether, how, and to what extent it should be regulated
in the United States.
As described in Matal v. Tam, hate speech is “[s]peech that demeans on the
basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar

109
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–49 (“A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly
intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
110
Price, supra note 22, at 824 (noting that “more recent decisions” like Tam and R.A.V. “have effectively
repudiated [the short-lived group libel] exception” created in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258–59
(1952)).
111
Matsuda, supra note 83, at 30–31.
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ground.”112 The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law
defines hate speech as “verbal or non-verbal communication that involves
hostility directed towards particular social groups, most often on the grounds of
race and ethnicity (racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, etc.), gender (sexism,
misogyny), sexual orientation (homophobia, transphobia), age . . . , disability[,]”
and similar bases.113
With a focus on action and the effects of speech, critical race theorists define
hate speech, or “assaultive speech,” as “words that are used as weapons to
ambush, terrorize, wound, humiliate, and degrade.”114 Hate speech has also been
approached from the public health perspective, which considers it a form of
“hate-motivated behavior,” a category of behavior that has been named “a public
health threat with structural, interpersonal, and individual antecedents and
effects.”115 These effects are the very real and pervasive harms hate speech
causes at the individual and societal level.116 These harms include harm to
individuals’ physical, mental, and emotional health, as well as social and
political harms.117
On the individual level, hate speech victims experience poor overall
emotional, mental, and physical health effects, with specific symptoms
including anger, shame, fear, depression, anxiety, suicidal behavior, and
unhealthy coping mechanisms such as alcohol or drug use.118 These dangers to
victims’ health and wellbeing are exacerbated by structural barriers and
inequalities that make it more difficult for minority groups to access health care
resources, as well as the inadequate care minority group members receive when
they do access the resources.119
112

Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (plurality opinion).
ULADZISLAU BELAVUSAU, HATE SPEECH, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Rainer Grote et al. eds., 2017), https://oxcon-ouplaw-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/
view/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e130?print=pdf.
114
MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, at 1.
115
Robert J. Cramer, Richard C. Fording, Phyllis Gerstenfeld, Andre Kehn, Jason Marsden, Cynthia
Deitle, Angela King, Shelley Smart & Matt R. Nobles, Hate-Motivated Behavior: Impacts, Risk Factors, and
Interventions, HEALTH AFFS. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20200929.601434/
full/health-affairs-brief-hate-behavior-public-health-cramer.pdf (emphasis added).
116
Id. at 2; see Matsuda, supra note 83, at 24.
117
Cramer et al., supra note 115, at 2; see Matsuda, supra note 83, at 24.
118
Cramer et al., supra note 115, at 2; see Matsuda, supra note 83, at 24 (noting additional symptoms such
as hypertension, psychosis, and suicide and describing the psychic effect of hate speech on victims as “spirit
murder”).
119
See Cramer et al., supra note 115, at 5. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
summarized these structural inequalities in a report, stating that minorities “face a social and economic
environment of inequality that includes greater exposure to racism and discrimination, violence, and poverty.”
Brief for Asian Americans Advancing Justice et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 22–23, Lee
113
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Emotionally, hate speech reinforces the exclusion of minority groups from
society and has the potential to cause minority group members to internalize that
exclusion and reject their identity.120 That sense of aloneness and exclusion is
heightened by government tolerance of hate speech.121 For example, “[w]hen
hundreds of police officers are called out to protect racist marchers, . . . the
victim becomes a stateless person. Target-group members must either identify
with a community that promotes racist speech or admit that the community does
not include them.”122 Professor Monica Bell has termed this statelessness “legal
estrangement,” through which “the law and its enforcers signal to marginalized
groups that they are not fully part of American society—that they are not imbued
with all the freedoms and entitlements that flow to other Americans, such as
dignity, safety, dreams, health, and political voice, to name a few.”123
In addition to the physical, mental, and emotional harms, hate speech also
harms victims socially and politically by implicitly restricting victims’ personal
freedom.124 Hate speech victims have had “to quit jobs, forgo education, leave
their homes, avoid certain public places, curtail their own exercise of speech
rights, and otherwise modify their behavior.”125 As to reputation, hate speech
creates and reinforces stereotypes that limit expectations in the minds of both
minority group members and dominant-group members as to what minority
group members can achieve.126 Importantly, while some scholars and
perspectives concentrate on hate speech as it pertains to racial or ethnic
minorities, “[n]o minority group is exempt from these harms,”127 and the harm
is not limited to minority groups; hate speech also impacts social cohesion on a
societal level.128

v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293) [hereinafter Amicus Brief], sub nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744
(2017) (plurality opinion) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: CULTURE, RACE
AND ETHNICITY–A SUPPLEMENT TO MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (2001)).
120
Matsuda, supra note 83, at 24–25.
121
Id. at 25.
122
Id.; see Boyle, supra note 24, at 502 (emphasizing that minorities “can cope with hate if they are
confident it is the view of the marginal. It is when they experience the inaction of the majority . . . or the
majority’s disinterest in their struggle for equality that hate speech hurts”).
123
Monica C. Bell, Legal Estrangement: A Concept for These Times, 48 FOOTNOTES (SPECIAL ISSUE) 7, 8
(2020), https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/attach/footnotes/footnotes_july-august_2020.pdf. Professor
Bell introduced this concept as a consequence of policing but has noted it is not limited to that context. Id.
124
Matsuda, supra note 83, at 24; Amicus Brief, supra note 119, at 22–23.
125
Matsuda, supra note 83, at 24.
126
Amicus Brief, supra note 119, at 23.
127
Id. at 25.
128
Matsuda, supra note 83, at 25.
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On a societal level, hate speech negatively impacts the way groups function
together, as well as stability and trust within society.129 Dominant-group
members who associate with members of a target group may be harassed and
threatened for such association.130 Further, members of the dominant group
often experience guilt due to the relief they feel because they are not, and will
likely never be, the victims of such speech.131 This divide between target and
non-target, or dominant, groups causes distrust between the two groups.132 This
division “forces victim-group members to view all dominant-group members
with suspicion” and “well-meaning dominant-group members to use kid-glove
care in dealing with outsiders.”133 Finally, at some level, hate speech is so
pervasive that the idea of racial inferiority is likely to take root in the minds of
both victims and well-meaning dominant-group members who may
unconsciously internalize those perspectives.134
In addition to these definitions and harms, another key element of
understanding the hate speech issue is that hate speech is relatively new as a
category of expression.135 Until recently, what is now recognized as “hate speech
was . . . mainstream speech. . . . There were no ‘hate groups’ espousing racism
and white superiority when it was in fact the official ideology or mainstream
idea.”136
B. Reappropriation
In choosing “The Slants” for his band’s name, Simon Tam intended to
reclaim the derogatory term “slant” to empower the Asian American community
against negative stereotypes; share the band members’ perspective or “slant” on
“what it’s like to be people of color in the U.S.”; and “pay[] homage to Asian-

129

Id.
Id.
131
Id. (“Thus [the dominant-group members] are drawn into unwilling complicity with[, for example,] the
Klan, spared from being the feared and degraded thing.”).
132
See id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
See Boyle, supra note 24, at 493–96 (discussing the United Nations’s adoption of international
agreements addressing hate speech in the mid to late 1960s). See generally MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, at
1–6 (discussing the development of critical race theory since the late 1970s, which catalyzed interrogation of
and scholarship on topics such as hate speech).
136
Boyle, supra note 24, at 493. Hate speech was—and, in many ways, still is—the status quo, and
“defenders of the status quo have discovered, in the [F]irst [A]mendment, a new weapon. The debate about
affirmative action and inclusion of historically excluded groups is being recast as a debate about free speech. . .
. without reference to historical context or uneven power relations” between the excluded groups and those who
establish and preserve the status quo. MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, at 14.
130
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American activists who had been using the term in this kind of self-appropriated
way for decades.”137 In other words, Tam was engaging in reappropriation, a
“cultural process by which a group reclaims terms or artifacts that were
previously used in a disparaging way towards that group . . . and shifts power
from dominant groups into the marginalized.”138 For generations,
reappropriation has been used by minority groups to remove the sting and stigma
from historically racist, hateful, and discriminatory devices, such as terms,
symbols, and images, by using those terms in a new context to empower and
define themselves.139 As a result of empowering the targeted group,
reappropriation revokes power from bigots, depriving them “of a linguistic
weapon” and placing that power to identify and define the minority in the hands
of the minority group members themselves.140 As Tam himself has expressed,
“[T]here’s so much power in being able to claim an identity; . . . when you say,
‘This belongs to me and my community,’ . . . instead of letting you use it as
something to push me down, it can be truly empowering and transformative.”141
The power of reappropriation has also been recognized by the scientific
community. In particular, reappropriation of slurs has long been considered by
linguists and sociologists as an effective way to foster “individual and group
identity, recapturing the ‘right of self-definition and naming one’s own
existence.’”142 However, despite the mainstream recognition of the power and
import of reappropriation, the concept has confounded the USPTO, which has
responded with inconsistent results when applicants have sought registration of
marks that might be considered disparaging to access the benefits that
accompany federal registration.143

137
Make No Law: The First Amendment Podcast, Disparagement, Contempt, and Disrepute, LEGAL TALK
NETWORK, at 00:25 (Mar. 15, 2018), https://legaltalknetwork.com/podcasts/make-no-law/2018/03/disparagementcontempt-and-disrepute/ (interviewing Simon Tam).
138
Tam, supra note 16, at 5.
139
See Sohn, supra note 19, at 1741–42; Conrad, supra note 19, at 85–86 (citations omitted) (“The
historically negative connotations of the label are challenged by the proud, positive connotations implied by a
group’s use of the term as a self-label.”).
140
Adam D. Galinsky, Kurt Hugenberg, Carla Groom & Galen V. Bodenhausen, The Reappropriation of
Stigmatizing Labels: Implications for Social Identity, in 5 IDENTITY ISSUES IN GROUPS 221, 232 (Jeffrey T.
Polzer ed., 2003).
141
Make No Law, supra note 137, at 01:45–02:04 (interviewing Simon Tam).
142
Sohn, supra note 19, at 1742 (quoting Todd Anten, Note, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social
Change: Factoring the Reappropriation of Slurs into Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 388,
422 (2006)).
143
See, e.g., Anten, supra note 142, at 388–93 (discussing the USPTO’s inconsistent treatment of
applications to register marks engaging in reappropriation).
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III. TRADEMARKS AND THE LANHAM ACT
This Part provides a brief overview of trademark law in the United States.
Specifically, it concentrates on the requirements to obtain a federal
registration—as that was at issue in the Tam decision—with a particular focus
on the significant benefits of having a federal registration.
A. The Lanham Act: Codifying Common Law Trademark Rights
Symbols have been used to “identify ownership or origin of [tangible and
intangible] articles for thousands of years.”144 In the seventeenth century,
English common law courts began to recognize rights for the use of marks
intended to identify an item’s source or origin.145 The English based these newly
acknowledged rights in existing property law.146 Later, in the development of
American trademark law, U.S. courts drew from English common law by basing
trademark rights on property law. Moreover, both English and American courts
recognized that “[t]he object or purpose of the law in protecting trademarks is
two-fold”: first, to protect the manufacturer, and second, to prevent consumer
confusion.147 For manufacturers, trademark protection allows a way to profit
from hard-earned consumer goodwill and shields against others’ attempts to
profit unfairly off that goodwill.148 For consumers, trademark protection
provides a means to navigate the marketplace with ease and assures that a
product sold under a distinctive mark is the genuine product of that
manufacturer.149
Additionally, though trademark rights do not rely on legislation for their
enforcement given their common law foundation,150 the United States has
statutory trademark protection in all fifty states and at the federal level.151 At the
federal level, after several unsuccessful attempts,152 Congress successfully

144
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:1 (5th ed.
2020); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1849–50 (2007) (noting the use of marks to “identify and distinguish one’s property dates to antiquity,
and regulations regarding that use almost as long”).
145
McKenna, supra note 144, at 1850–54.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 1858–60, 1863–65 (quoting Boardman v. Meriden Brittania Co., 35 Conn. 402, 404 (1868)).
148
Id. at 1858–60.
149
Id. at 1863–64.
150
In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93 (1879).
151
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
152
See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 144, § 5:3 (discussing Congress’s attempts at trademark
legislation in the Act of 1870; the Act of March 3, 1881; and the Act of 1905).
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codified trademark rights in the Lanham Act of 1946,153 providing “a degree of
national uniformity” for trademark protection and a scheme that fosters
competition and encourages producers to maintain a high quality of goods and
services.154
The Lanham Act “provide[s] a mechanism for the registration of trademarks,
describe[s] the types of marks that may [and may not] be registered, and
specif[ies] the procedural and substantive advantages afforded to the owner of a
trademark registration.”155 The Act also provides legal frameworks for claims of
infringement of registered and unregistered trademarks,156 as well as a broad
definition of what may constitute a trademark.157
As outlined in the Lanham Act, a trademark is a designation—including
“any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof”—that serves
to “identify and distinguish” a person’s goods or services from another’s goods
or services.158 If the designation “identif[ies] the source of one seller’s goods [or
services] and distinguish[es] that source from other sources,” then the
designation is “distinctive” and therefore entitled to legal protection.159 Within
the realm of federal trademark law, legal protection is available for both
registered and unregistered marks, but federal registration of a trademark
provides mark owners with numerous “procedural and substantive legal
advantages over-reliance on common law rights.”160
B. Why Register? Benefits of Federal Registration on the Principal Register161
Put simply, “[f]ederal registration is the T.S.A. PreCheck of intellectualproperty law: Not everyone has to get it, but if you do a lot of business, you
probably should.”162 Broadly speaking, the advantages of federal registration of
153

Id. § 5:4.
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017) (plurality opinion) (explaining why federal trademark
legislation is desirable).
155
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
156
MCCARTHY, supra note 144, § 5:4 (discussing the use of Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), to
assert claims—which were previously only available under state law—of infringement of an unregistered mark).
157
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
158
Id.
159
MCCARTHY, supra note 144, § 3:1; see also BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN-SOURCE
CASEBOOK 34–35 (7th ed. 2020) (defining “distinctiveness”).
160
MCCARTHY, supra note 144, § 19:9.
161
The Lanham Act also created the Supplemental Register for marks that “are not registrable on the
Principal Register, but . . . are ‘capable of distinguishing’ goods and services” and marks that may later become
registrable on the Principal Register. Id. § 19:32 (citations omitted); Lanham Act §§ 23, 27, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091,
1095. This Comment focuses on the Principal Register and its benefits.
162
Jeong, supra note 13.
154
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a mark on the Principal Register include nationwide notice of constructive use
from the filing date of the application for registration;163 the potential for the
registration to become “incontestable,” which substantially reduces the number
of ways a registration can be challenged;164 prima facie evidence of the mark’s
validity, registration, and the registrant’s ownership and right to exclusive use
of the mark; federal jurisdiction to sue for infringement; and the possibility of
recovering treble damages.165
In addition to the considerable legal benefits, there are also practical
advantages to having a federally registered trademark. The Slants, for example,
sought federal registration in part because, according to Simon Tam, “[i]f you
want a record label deal, they won’t sign you unless you have a registered
trademark.”166 So began a long journey toward registration that brought Simon
Tam and The Slants before the Supreme Court and into a national dialogue about
trademarks and hate speech.
IV. FREE SPEECH ABSOLUTISM COMES TO TRADEMARK LAW
This Part first discusses the landmark trademark case of Matal v. Tam and
the double-edged sword its holding created within the realm of trademark law.
It then discusses Tam’s companion case, Iancu v. Brunetti, and concerns over
the combined effect and implications of the two holdings.
A. Matal v. Tam
Beginning with a discussion of the federal trademark registration battle that
led Simon Tam to challenge the constitutionality of the disparagement clause,
this section breaks down the Supreme Court’s opinions in Tam and discusses the
reactions to and ramifications of that decision.
1. The Road to the Supreme Court
When Simon Tam started his all-Asian American dance-rock band, he chose
the name “The Slants” to represent the band members’ “perspective, or slant, on
life as people of color, geeks, and musicians. It was also reappropriating a

163

Lanham Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1057.
Lanham Act §§ 15, 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115.
165
MCCARTHY, supra note 144, § 19:9.
166
Nina Totenberg, In Battle over Band Name, Supreme Court Considers Free Speech and Trademarks,
NPR (Jan. 18, 2017, 4:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/18/510310945/in-battle-over-band-name-supreme-courtconsiders-free-speech-and-trademarks.
164
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stereotype that people often hold about Asians, that we all have slanted eyes.”167
Though the band was not started to be a “socio-political project,”168 it
increasingly became one, as The Slants became “deeply involved with Asian
American advocacy organizations . . . and helped lead discussions on race and
identity across North America.”169
As The Slants gained success, the band decided to pursue a federal trademark
registration for their name.170 Tam applied to register “The Slants” as a mark
twice but was denied both times under the disparagement clause of Section 2(a)
of the Lanham Act.171
The disparagement clause bars registration of marks that “[c]onsist[] of or
comprise[] . . . matter which may disparage . . . persons, living or dead,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols.”172 Whether a mark is disparaging is
determined by a two-part test applied by the Examining Attorney assigned to a
particular application.173 First, the Examining Attorney “considers the likely
meaning of the matter in question” based on dictionary definitions, the nature of
the goods or services, and how the mark is used in connection with the goods or
services.174 Then, “[i]f that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons,
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,” the Examining Attorney asks
“whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the
referenced group.”175 Such a finding constitutes a prima facie case of
disparagement and shifts the burden to the applicant to demonstrate otherwise.176
Perhaps most notably in this analysis, however, the applicant’s intent in using
the mark—e.g., reappropriation—is irrelevant.177

167

Tam, supra note 16, at 4.
Id.
169
Id. at 4–5.
170
Jeong, supra note 13.
171
Tam, supra note 16, at 7–10.
172
Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
173
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (plurality opinion); Tam, supra note 16, at 7
(“Determination of what [is disparaging] is based on the subjective sensibilities of each individual Examining
Attorney, which is why DYKES ON BIKES and other cases may receive two different responses with the exact
same phrase.”). The USPTO itself acknowledged the vagueness and subjectiveness of the test. Tam, 137 S. Ct.
at 1756–57 n.5 (plurality opinion).
174
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753 (plurality opinion) (citing TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), http://tmep.uspto.gov).
175
Id. at 1753 (quoting TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), http://tmep.uspto.gov).
176
Id. (citing TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), http://tmep.uspto.gov).
177
Id. (quoting TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), http://tmep.uspto.gov) (“[T]he [US]PTO has specified
that ‘[t]he fact that an applicant may be a member of that group or has good intentions underlying its use of a
term does not obviate the fact that a substantial composite of the referenced group would find the term
objectionable.’”).
168
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In the case of The Slants, the Examining Attorney who reviewed the band’s
application for registration rejected it because “it is uncontested that applicant
[Simon Tam] is a founding member of a band . . . composed of members of
Asian descent.”178 According to the Examining Attorney, “if [the band] had been
comprised of any other ethnicity, [then the] mark would not be considered
disparaging” because there would be no connection to individuals of Asian
descent to call to mind the term’s disparaging meaning.179 To demonstrate the
term’s allegedly disparaging meaning, the Examining Attorney cited definitions
from UrbanDictionary.com and an image of Miley Cyrus pulling at her eyes to
make them appear slanted but no evidence of any Asian Americans who
considered the term disparaging.180 The burden then shifted to The Slants to
demonstrate, on appeal, that the mark was not disparaging.181
Tam attempted to meet that burden twice to no avail, despite evidence
supporting The Slants’s use of the term, evidence supporting the use of the term
for reappropriation generally, linguistics expert opinions, survey evidence, legal
declarations detailing the band’s work with Asian American organizations,182
and the filing of a second “ethnic neutral” application to avoid the association
that the USPTO claimed made the mark disparaging.183 After being rejected
twice by the USPTO, Tam appealed to the Federal Circuit.184 He saw the
USPTO’s application of the disparagement clause as an “inherent flaw in the
legal system” that disproportionately affected minorities “based on their race,
religion, sexuality, and gender” because those characteristics are generally both
the one element that creates the context which makes a mark disparaging and
the one thing the applicant cannot change.185
Before the Federal Circuit, Tam challenged the constitutionality of the
disparagement clause. After initially affirming the rejection of The Slants’s
application and rejecting Tam’s constitutional challenges,186 the court sua
178
Tam, supra note 16, at 2 (quoting U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,472,044 (filed Nov. 14,
2011) (citing Office Action dated June 20, 2012)).
179
Id.
180
Id. at 7.
181
See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753 (plurality opinion) (citing TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (Apr. 2017), http://tmep.
uspto.gov); Tam, supra note 16, at 7–8.
182
Tam, supra note 16, at 7–9. These legal and other expert services were donated. Id. Had those services
not been donated, Tam noted, “the costs would have been unbearable,” and the band would likely not have
proceeded. Id. at 8–11 (discussing the financial aspect of the inequitable trademark application process pre-Tam
that disproportionately affected minorities).
183
Id. at 9.
184
Id. at 10.
185
Id.
186
In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 572–73 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 808 F.3d
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sponte ordered a rehearing en banc and held that the disparagement clause was
unconstitutional as a “governmental regulation that burdens private speech
based on disapproval of the message conveyed,” which is subject to and unable
to survive strict scrutiny.187
2. The Slants’s Success at the Supreme Court
In 2017, the Supreme Court affirmed the en banc judgment of the Federal
Circuit in an opinion that has been a double-edged sword within trademark law
since it was issued. The Tam opinion can be divided into three main sections:
(1) the opinion of the Court,188 (2) Justice Alito’s four-justice plurality, and (3)
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. First, and most significantly, the Court held that
the disparagement clause of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act was
unconstitutional because it violated a “bedrock First Amendment principle:
Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”189
Particularly, the clause is unconstitutional because it allows the government to
engage in viewpoint discrimination by barring the registration of marks that it
finds disparaging.190
Specifically, the First Amendment protects against content discrimination,
which is the punishment or restriction of speech through “laws ‘targeted at
specific subject matter’” and of which viewpoint discrimination is a
subcategory.191 Viewpoint discrimination, in turn, describes laws that punish or
restrict speech based on the perspective that the speech expresses on a particular
subject.192 In general, a regulation on private speech constitutes viewpoint
discrimination when “the government has singled out a subset of messages for
disfavor based on the views expressed.”193 This violates the First Amendment
principle that “the government may not punish or suppress speech based on

1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)
(plurality opinion).
187
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334–35. For an explanation of viewpoint discrimination and strict scrutiny, see
infra Part IV.A.2.
188
Matal v. Tam was decided by only eight justices; Justice Gorsuch did not participate. Tam, 137 S. Ct.
at 1765 (plurality opinion).
189
Id. at 1751.
190
Id. at 1757.
191
Id. at 1765–66 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015)).
192
Id. at 1766 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995)).
193
Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
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disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys.”194 Both content
and viewpoint discrimination are “presumptively unconstitutional.”195
Laws that permit content and viewpoint discrimination are subject to strict
scrutiny, the level of constitutional scrutiny “used to review any governmental
regulation that burdens private speech based on disapproval of the message
conveyed.”196 Under strict scrutiny, such regulations “may be justified only if
the government proves that [the laws] are narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests.”197 The only viewpoint discrimination exempt from strict scrutiny
is government speech, an exception the USPTO claimed applied to federallyregistered trademarks.198
Government speech is not subject to strict scrutiny because some amount of
viewpoint discrimination is required for the government to function: “When a
government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular
viewpoint and rejects others.”199 However, while this doctrine is necessary, the
Tam Court emphasized that it is—and must continue to be—narrow in order to
prevent “dangerous misuse”: “If private speech could be passed off as
government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval,
government could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.”200
Such was the Court’s response to the USPTO’s argument that registered
trademarks should be treated as government speech and thus not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.201 The Court unequivocally stated that “[t]rademarks are
private, not government, speech” and affirmed the Federal Circuit’s en banc
judgment that the disparagement clause was subject to and unable to withstand
strict scrutiny.202

194

Id. at 1765 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1766 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–29); In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (plurality opinion).
196
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334; see Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011).
197
In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334.
198
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757–60 (plurality opinion) (“[O]ur cases recognize that ‘[t]he Free Speech Clause
. . . does not regulate government speech.’” (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467
(2009))).
199
Id. at 1757. For example, during World War II, the government distributed posters supporting the war
effort—thus preferencing a particular viewpoint—but, due to the government speech doctrine, was neither
prevented from doing so nor required to distribute posters discouraging support of the war effort. Id. at 1758.
200
Id. at 1758.
201
Id. at 1758–60.
202
Id. at 1760, 1765; In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1337 (“[N]o argument has been made that the [disparagement
clause] survives such scrutiny.”).
195
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Justice Alito’s plurality opinion—joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Breyer—addressed the USPTO’s three alternative
arguments in defense of the disparagement clause, including that the
discrimination permitted by the clause was constitutional because (1) trademark
registration is a government subsidy, (2) trademark registration is a government
program (suggesting the creation of a new doctrine), or (3) trademarks are
commercial speech.203
Justice Alito’s opinion rejected the USPTO’s first argument—that trademark
registration is a government subsidy program—because trademark registration
does not resemble the subsidy programs in the cases upon which the USPTO
relied, which generally involved the government providing funds or tax benefits
to private parties.204 While trademark registration “provides valuable nonmonetary benefits” that result from the government’s role in processing the
registration and, by extension, an expenditure of government funds, Justice Alito
noted the same can be said of “just about every government service.”205 Justice
Alito rejected the USPTO’s second argument—advocating for a new
“‘government program’ doctrine”—under similar reasoning.206
With regard to the USPTO’s third argument, Justice Alito rejected the
contention that registered trademarks should be considered commercial speech,
meaning the disparagement clause would be subject to intermediate scrutiny
rather than strict scrutiny.207 Justice Alito reasoned that the Court did not need
to determine whether trademarks are commercial speech because, even if they
are, the disparagement clause cannot survive intermediate scrutiny under the test
set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
of New York.208 For a restriction on speech to be constitutional under the Central
Hudson test, the restriction must (1) serve a substantial government interest and
(2) be “narrowly drawn,” meaning the restriction must regulate speech only as
far as necessary to serve the substantial interest.209
The USPTO claimed that two government interests justified the
disparagement restriction. First, the USPTO claimed an interest in preventing
marginalized groups from being confronted with disparaging messaging in
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

564–65).

Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1761.
Id.
Id. at 1761–63.
Id. at 1763–64.
Id.; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1980).
Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (plurality opinion) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at
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advertising.210 In perhaps the most memorable part of his plurality, Justice Alito
rejected that interest: “Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity,
gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the
proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom
to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”211
The USPTO also claimed an interest in “protecting the orderly flow of
commerce” from disruption by disparaging trademarks, which have been
likened to “discriminatory conduct, which has been recognized to have an
adverse effect on commerce.”212 Regardless of the substantialness of the
interests, the plurality stated that “[a] simple answer to [the commercial speech]
argument is that the disparagement clause is not ‘narrowly drawn.’”213 In other
words, the disparagement clause applied to bar registration of marks that
disparage “any person, group, or institution” and is not limited to protect only
the individuals and groups that the government expressed an interest in
protecting.214 The restriction “is not an anti-discrimination clause; it is a happytalk clause.”215 It is therefore broader “than is necessary to serve the interest
asserted” and cannot pass the intermediate scrutiny test.216
Writing separately, Justice Kennedy concurred in part—as to the findings of
viewpoint discrimination and that registered trademarks are not government
speech—and in the judgment; he was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan.217 The Kennedy concurrence posited that the viewpoint
discrimination issue alone invoked strict scrutiny, and thus consideration of
other questions, like whether trademarks are commercial speech, was
unnecessary.218

210

Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
212
Id. (citations omitted).
213
Id. at 1764–65.
214
Id. at 1765.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
218
Id. at 1767 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)) (“‘Commercial speech is no
exception’ . . . to the principle that the First Amendment ‘requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government
creates a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’”). Justice Thomas also
concurred, opining that speech restrictions should always receive strict scrutiny regardless of whether the speech
is commercial. Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
211
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3. Reactions and Ramifications to Tam: A Double-Edged Sword
Almost immediately after the Tam decision was announced, critics and
commentators voiced concerns over the consequences of the Court’s
“pronouncement of a fundamental right to register a racial epithet” as a federal
trademark and questioned whether the Court would have reached the same result
in a case with less “favorable facts” or less sympathetic and well-intentioned
plaintiffs than those involved Tam.219 In particular, many commentators,
including Tam himself, have pointed out the double-edged sword effect of the
decision—that Tam may “inadvertently help[] groups whose intentions are not
as pure” as The Slants’s.220 This effect is acutely apparent with regard to a
similar but less sympathetic case contemporaneous with Tam—the case to
cancel the then-Washington Redskins’s federal trademark registration for
disparaging Native Americans.221 The Supreme Court declined to hear the
football team’s case but granted certiorari to The Slants, though both cases
challenged the constitutionality of the disparagement clause on First
Amendment grounds.222 Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari to The
Slants and found the disparagement clause unconstitutional, the Redskins’s case
was moot and the team’s marks were not cancelled.223 Under Tam, both The
Slants’s reappropriation use of a slur and the Washington Redskins’s nonreappropriation use of a slur are treated equally—both are eligible for federal
registration though the intent behind the use of the two marks is very different.224
219

Lee, supra note 19, at 2004, 2006.
Tam, supra note 16, at 11; see Conrad, supra note 19, at 123; Jeong, supra note 13 (“[T]he Slants aren’t
the only people caught in the cross hairs of Section 2(a)—they’re just the more sympathetic ones.”).
221
Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the team on the issue of whether its trademarks should be cancelled for disparagement).
The Native American community had been fighting for the cancellation of the Washington Redskins’s federal
trademark registrations since at least 1992 in “an endless slog of litigation” that led to the marks’ cancellation in
1999 and 2014, the latter of which was the subject of the appeal. Jeong, supra note 13. Amidst the surge of
support for the Black Lives Matter movement in the summer of 2020, the Washington Redskins decided to
change the team’s name and logo. Rosa Sanchez, NFL’s Washington Redskins to Change Name Following Years
of Backlash, ABC NEWS (July 13, 2020, 11:34 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/washington-redskins-changeyears-backlash/story?id=71744369. For the 2020 football season, the organization announced it would use the
temporary name the “Washington Football Team.” Emily Iannaconi, Franchise Formerly Known as Redskins
Announces New Name in Time for 2020 Season: Washington Football Team, FORBES (July 23, 2020, 2:28 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilyiannaconi/2020/07/23/washington-announces-franchise-will-be-calledwashington-football-team-for-upcoming-season/?sh=151abaa1c9f9.
222
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 558 U.S. 1025, 1025 (2009) (denying certiorari). Some commentators have
suggested that this separation indicates that the Court perceived what Tam called the “fundamental difference”
between the two situations and “would rather have the two cases detached from each other.” Jeong, supra note
13.
223
Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 709 F. App’x 182, 183 (4th Cir. 2018).
224
See Tam, supra note 16, at 11 (discussing the then-Redskins and “the notion of [Tam] inadvertently
helping groups whose intentions are not as pure”).
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Thus, while Tam was a victory for The Slants and the project of reappropriation,
“it also opened the door for organizations . . . to continue profiting from racially
or culturally disparaging terms.”225
Since Tam, applications for federal registration of marks containing racial
epithets have been filed with and approved by the USPTO.226 Some of these
applications were filed on June 19, 2017—the very day the Tam decision was
announced.227 Some such applications were even filed by minority group
members and well-meaning dominant-group members, “like a team playing
defense,” to secure the mark and prevent it from being used by someone with a
truly hateful or ignorant intent.228 Ironically, under this course of action,
applicants have to actually use the marks in commerce to some degree to obtain
and maintain their registration.229
On the other hand, after Tam, there remained a small possibility that
applications to register marks consisting of some of the most egregious racial
epithets could be denied under a surviving Section 2(a) provision against the
registration of “immoral . . . or scandalous” marks.230 That possibility was
eliminated two years after Tam, however, with the Court’s decision in Iancu v.
Brunetti, which, following the precedent set in Tam, struck down the “immoral
or scandalous” clause.231
B. The Companion Case: Iancu v. Brunetti
In Iancu v. Brunetti, the Supreme Court revisited the Lanham Act with a
focus on the “immoral or scandalous” clause of Section 2(a).232 The “immoral
or scandalous” clause barred registration of marks that “[c]onsist[] of or
comprise[] immoral . . . or scandalous matter.”233 When Brunetti reached the
Supreme Court, the Court followed the precedent set in Tam.234 The Court held

225

Sohn, supra note 19, at 1730–31.
Lee, supra note 19, at 2003–04 nn.8–9; see also Katyal, supra note 15, at 825 (noting the filing of two
applications to register marks containing the “n-word” on the day the Tam opinion was announced and at least
ten other applications for racially or otherwise disparaging marks within the next five weeks).
227
Lee, supra note 19, at 2003–04.
228
Katyal, supra note 15, at 827 (citing applications for registration of the “n-word” and a swastika).
229
Id.
230
Lee, supra note 19, at 2004.
231
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019).
232
Id. (concerning a rejected application to register “FUCT” as a trademark for a clothing line).
233
Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). A mark is “immoral or scandalous” if the USPTO Examining
Attorney finds that a majority of the public would consider the mark “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or
propriety; . . . disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; or vulgar.” Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298 (citation omitted).
234
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297.
226
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that the “immoral or scandalous” clause violated the First Amendment in the
same manner as the disparagement clause: “It too disfavor[ed] certain ideas,”
and thus constituted viewpoint discrimination.235
For some scholars and commentators, the implications of the combined
effect of Tam and Brunetti are concerningly comprehensive. Taken together, in
the name of free speech, Tam and Brunetti have cleared the way for the potential
for “our branded world . . . [to] look more like . . . a virtual Insult-o-Mart of the
most flagrant terms for derision.”236 Interestingly, a close reading of Brunetti
indicates that some of the Justices may have shared similar concerns.237
While the Brunetti Court was in agreement that the “immoral or scandalous”
clause violated the First Amendment, the Court was much more fractured than
it had been in Tam.238 The majority was written by Justice Kagan and joined by
the unexpected quintet of Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh.239 Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts240 and Justice Breyer241 each
wrote opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part; Justice Sotomayor was
joined by Justice Breyer in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part242; and Justice Alito, who wrote the opinion of the Court and the plurality
in Tam, wrote a concurrence.243
In Brunetti’s fractured opinions, commentator Ilhyung Lee perceived “signs
of second thoughts for some Justices regarding the reach of Tam and its
consequences.”244 For example, Justice Breyer suggested that “[t]he
Government has at least a reasonable interest in ensuring that it is not involved
in promoting [through federal trademark registration] highly vulgar or obscene
speech, and that it will not be associated with that speech”—an argument he had
rejected as to racist speech as part of the plurality in Tam.245 In their respective

235

Id.
Katyal, supra note 15, at 824. However, others have argued that the marketplace will operate to exclude
racist and hateful marks. See Jake MacKay, Racist Trademarks and Consumer Activism: How the Market Takes
Care of Business, 42 L. & PSYCH. REV. 131, 147 (2018) (arguing for companies to be able to register racist or
derogatory marks); Tam, supra note 16, at 16 (referring to Tam as a “Pandora’s Box or floodgate for hate speech
[that] has been opened”). For a response to this market-based argument, see infra Part V.D.2.
237
Lee, supra note 19, at 2012.
238
Id.
239
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2296.
240
Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
241
Id. at 2304–08 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
242
Id. at 2308–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
243
Id. at 2302–03 (Alito, J., concurring).
244
Lee, supra note 19, at 2012.
245
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236
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opinions, Chief Justice Roberts (a member of the Tam plurality) and Justice
Sotomayor also suggested that the government has such an interest.246
Accordingly, Lee questioned “whether the Government may have a similar
interest regarding the trademark registration of hateful racial epithets.”247
Justice Breyer also revisited the issue of allowing the registration of racial
slurs, citing “scientific evidence . . . that certain highly vulgar words have a
physiological and emotional impact that makes them different in kind from most
other words.”248 He included in this category race-based epithets, expressing
concern about “the list of offensive swear words”249 evolving to include such
slurs and the consequences of permitting their registration:
These attention-grabbing words . . . may lead to the creation of public
spaces that many will find repellant, perhaps on occasion creating the
risk of verbal altercations or even physical confrontations. . . . The
Government thus has an interest in . . . disincentiviz[ing] the use of
such words in commerce by denying the benefit of trademark
registration.250

That Justice Breyer voiced these concerns is particularly surprising given that
he had joined the Tam plurality opinion two years earlier, which stated in no
uncertain terms that the protection of hateful speech is the “proudest boast” of
American free speech jurisprudence.251
Even more surprising, Justice Alito, who authored the Tam plurality, joined
the majority in Brunetti but filed a concurring opinion as to the possibility—and,
perhaps, desirability—of Congress “adopting a more carefully focused statute
that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms that play no real
part in the expression of ideas . . . [and] generally signif[y] nothing except
emotion and a severely limited vocabulary.”252 While Justice Alito, Justice
246
Id. at 2303–04 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the Government’s
interest in “not associating itself with trademarks whose content is obscene, vulgar, or profane. The First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech; it does not require the Government to give aid and comfort to those
using obscene, vulgar, and profane modes of expression”); id. at 2317 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
247
Lee, supra note 19, at 2013.
248
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249
Id.
250
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)). This citation
to Brandenburg, the case that established the incitement exception, could suggest the potential for hateful racebased epithets to constitute speech that would fall within the incitement exception to First Amendment
protection.
251
Lee, supra note 19, at 2013; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (plurality opinion).
252
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Interestingly, like Justice Breyer’s
Brandenburg citation, the language used by Justice Alito here is nearly identical to the language that established
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Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts were referring to vulgar words as opposed to
hate speech, these concurrences invite compelling questions: “What part does a
[slur] play . . . in the ‘expression of ideas’? . . . Is the racial slur or image ‘needed
to express any idea,’ or instead, does its use signify little ‘except emotion and a
severely limited vocabulary?’”253
V. A SOLUTION TO TAM’S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
This Part outlines some of the arguments made by critical race theorists,
legal scholars, and others against protecting hate speech under the First
Amendment. Joining that argument, this Comment then proposes an amendment
to the Lanham Act to resolve the double-edged sword issue presented by the
Tam decision and its consequences. This Part also distinguishes the amendment
proposed here from other suggested solutions.
A. The Problems with Protecting Hate Speech
Critical race theorists, legal scholars, and commentators interrogating and
opposing American tolerance of hate speech argue that the current absolutist
interpretation of the First Amendment is not compatible with American society
today nor the constitutional rights and norms it claims to provide and protect for
each citizen—namely, the right to equal protection under law. These authors find
that the common justifications for tolerating hate speech within a broader right
to freedom of speech—for example, that free speech “respects individual
autonomy and opinion, increases our access to ideas, protects dissent, and
respects citizens’ rights to self-governance”—are “at best, incomplete, and, at
worst, harmful.”254 By upholding an ideal of tolerance and ascribing “equivalent
truth value” to every perspective, First Amendment absolutism “entrenches and
legitimizes ideas that deny [minorities and minority groups] their humanity,”
thus preventing social change and “preserv[ing] legal, social, and political
structures.”255 In the specific context of race-based hate speech, scholars argue
that the First Amendment is weaponized to perpetuate and legitimize racism in
the name of free speech and in violation of the Equal Protection clause:
The first amendment arms conscious and unconscious racists—Nazis
and liberals alike—with a constitutional right to be racist. Racism is
the fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and could suggest the potential for hateful racebased epithets to constitute speech that would fall within the fighting words exception. See supra Part I.B.1.
253
Lee, supra note 19, at 2014 (quoting Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring)).
254
Bradley, supra note 25, at 520 (citing MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST
AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINALITY 1–17 (2001)).
255
Id.
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just another idea deserving of constitutional protection like all ideas.
The first amendment is employed to trump or nullify the only
substantive meaning of the equal protection clause, that the
Constitution mandates the disestablishment of the ideology of
racism.256

Tolerance of hate speech has the same discriminatory effect when the speech
targets individuals based on their “race, colour, ethnicity, religious beliefs,
sexual orientation, or other status,” like sex.257
The denial of the right to equal protection to minorities in order to uphold
absolute freedom of expression for all exemplifies philosopher Karl Popper’s
“paradox of tolerance.”258 The paradox of tolerance highlights the danger of
unlimited or absolute tolerance—that “[i]f we extend unlimited tolerance even
to those who are intolerant, . . . then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance
with them.”259 Popper therefore proposes that “[w]e should . . . claim, in the
name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.”260 Further, because of
the potential for unchecked intolerance to destroy tolerance, Popper argues that
any movement promoting intolerance or incitement to intolerance should be
considered criminal.261
In Tam, the Court expanded its free speech absolutism into trademark law,
stating that “the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we
protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate,’” such as intolerant
speech.262 However, this proposition, which undergirds free speech absolutism
generally, fails to recognize the dire consequences of not differentiating between
“dissent—or the right to criticize the powerful institutions that govern our
lives—and hate speech, which is directed against the least powerful segments of
our community.”263 The former is more representative of the culture of dissent
through which a democratic society evolves, as imagined by John Stuart Mill
and the framers of the U.S. Constitution.264 It is also more representative of the

256

MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, at 15 (emphasis added).
Boyle, supra note 24, at 489 (noting these categories as examples of the bases on which hate speech
victims are targeted).
258
KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 581 n.4 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 2020)
(emphasis omitted).
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
263
MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 30, at 10 (emphasis added).
264
See Bradley, supra note 25, at 533–34.
257
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political speech-oriented case law that laid the foundation for the Supreme
Court’s free speech absolutism.265 The latter—hate speech—violates the Equal
Protection Clause and appears to fall into the category of speech that the
Supreme Court defined when it first articulated the “fighting words” exception
to the First Amendment: words which “by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”266 The Chaplinsky Court stated
the following:
[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality. “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in
any proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act
would raise no question under that instrument.”267

In this articulation of the fighting words exception, the Supreme Court
demonstrated an understanding of this distinction between, on the one hand,
speech that is actual “communication” and contributes to the development and
progress of society and, on the other hand, speech that does not possess such
value, like hate speech.268 However, in this area, the Court has chosen only to
restrict speech in accordance with the speech-conduct distinction, under which
“mere” hate speech that does not immediately provoke violent action is
protected. This is contrary to the way speech is treated by many philosophers of
language and some legal scholars.269 The speech-conduct distinction conceives
of most speech as passive, whereas philosophers of language view speech itself,
colloquially, as “doing things with words to people.”270 Likewise, legal scholar
Stanley Fish has noted that “because everything we say impinges on the world
in ways indistinguishable from the effects of physical action, we must take
responsibility for our verbal performances . . . and not assume that they are being
taken care of by a clause in the Constitution.”271
In addition to the conception of speech itself as action, there is also an
inescapable correlation between the proliferation of hate speech and acts of
physical violence against hate speech victims that makes it difficult to determine

265
266
267
268
269
270
271

See supra Part I.A.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940)).
Id.
See, e.g., The Philosopher’s Arms, supra note 30, at 07:03; FISH, supra note 30, at 114.
The Philosopher’s Arms, supra note 30, at 06:47.
FISH, supra note 30, at 114 (emphasis added).
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where speech ends and action begins.272 For example, as legal scholar and
critical race theorist Mari Matsuda has pointed out, the “deadly violence that
accompanies the persistent verbal degradation of those subordinated because of
gender or sexuality explodes the notion that there are clear lines between words
and deeds.”273 Even more specifically, the United States witnessed the
correlation between hate speech and violence in the increase in hate crimes
against Asian Americans in the beginning of 2020, which many attributed to the
Trump administration’s practice of calling the coronavirus the “Chinese virus,”
the “Wuhan virus,” or the “Kung Flu.”274
Hate speech, whether expressed in a trademark or at an alt-right rally, is an
act that causes harm in itself, leads to greater and more frequent violence against
minorities, and does not contribute to the marketplace of ideas in any meaningful
way. To pretend otherwise in the name of democracy is to legitimize and
perpetuate the systems and power dynamics that deny the guarantee of equal
protection to minorities in the United States.
B. A Solution Within Trademark Law
This section explains this Comment’s proposed amendment to the Lanham
Act. The two-pronged amendment would include (1) a clause barring federal
registration of marks that would constitute hate speech and (2) an exception to
permit registration of such marks when they are used to engage in
reappropriation.
The proposed amendment to the Lanham Act would—as part of a
widespread decision on the part of the federal government to exclude hate speech
from First Amendment protection—bar federal registration of marks that would
constitute hate speech. However, the amendment would also include a
reappropriation exception to the bar against hateful marks to allow for minority
groups to engage in reappropriation of hate speech through a burden-shifting
framework. Marks that constitute hate speech would be presumptively barred
272

See id.; Matsuda, supra note 83, at 23.
Matsuda, supra note 83, at 23.
274
See Madeleine Aggeler, The U.S. Is Seeing a Massive Spike in Anti-Asian Hate Crimes, THE CUT
(Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/2021/02/the-us-is-seeing-a-massive-spike-in-anti-asian-hate-crimes.
html?utm_source=instagram&utm_medium=social_acct&utm_campaign=nym&utm_content=nym&utm_term
=curalate_like2buy_K7xsY9mK__1de06716-5541-42be-8284-ea310c5ff968 (noting use of “China virus” and
“Wuhan virus” and citing, inter alia, U.N. data showing more than 1,800 anti-Asian incidents in the United States
between March and May 2020, coinciding with the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic); Weijia Jang, Bo
Erickson, Arden Farhi & Gaby Ake, Biden to Address Racism Toward Asian Americans During Pandemic with
Executive Action, CBS NEWS (Jan. 26, 2021, 2:31PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/biden-racism-asianamericans-executive-action/ (noting the Trump administration’s use of “Kung Flu”).
273
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from registration, and the burden would be on the applicant to introduce
evidence that they are making a reappropriation use of the mark. An applicant
could establish a prima facie claim of reappropriation by (1) demonstrating that
they are a member of a protected class or a class that has been historically
discriminated against and (2) providing evidence that they are using the mark to
engage in reappropriation. In other words, as to the second requirement, the
applicant’s intent in using the mark would be considered in the USPTO’s
evaluation of whether to grant registration. The applicant could submit evidence
from their own experience using the mark, as well as other extrinsic evidence
such as opinions from linguistic experts and examples of other civil rights or
advocacy groups using the mark for reappropriation. If the applicant was able to
make out a prima facie claim of reappropriation, the burden would then shift to
the USPTO to consider the claim and, if necessary, demonstrate that the
reappropriation value does not outweigh the harm of granting a registration to
the mark and allowing the term in society. In this consideration, the USPTO
could consider a number of non-exclusive factors, such as those suggested by
the amicus brief of Asian Americans Advancing Justice in Tam, including (1)
“whether the mark is part of a reclamation effort;” (2) the history and “potential
harmful effects of the term,” and (3) “how expressive the mark is.”275 As the
amicus brief suggested, “simply claiming reappropriation is [not] enough to
obtain trademark protection for an otherwise harmful and disparaging mark”;
the test should “look[] holistically” at the mark and circumstances surrounding
it.276
C. Distinguishing from Other Solutions
This section discusses the ways in which this Comment’s proposal is distinct
from and more appropriate than other proposed solutions, namely (1) the judicial
test for reappropriation suggested by the amicus brief of Asian Americans
Advancing Justice and (2) a reappropriation defense to trademark infringement.
In an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in advance of Tam, Asian
Americans Advancing Justice and a number of other civil rights and advocacy
groups urged the Court to “adopt a narrower holding” rather than “[c]ompletely
removing” the disparagement clause.277 Specifically, the brief suggested a
“sharper judicial scalpel to balance the interest of free speech and the strong
public policy against prejudice, discrimination, and aiding in the commercial

275
276
277

Amicus Brief, supra note 119, at 17.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 4.
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appropriation of slurs and disparaging terms.”278 The brief imagined this scalpel
as a judicial test and suggested several non-exclusive factors for the Court to
consider in such a test, including (1) “whether the mark is part of a reclamation
effort;” (2) the history and “potential harmful effects of the term,” and (3) “how
expressive the mark is.”279 Like the amendment proposed here, the brief
suggested that, under a proper judicial test, “simply claiming reappropriation is
[not] enough to obtain trademark protection for an otherwise harmful and
disparaging mark,” and that the test should “look holistically” at the mark and
circumstances surrounding it.280 While the factors that the brief suggested are
similar to those that would be involved in applying for registration under the
reappropriation exception proposed here, the brief’s solution is a judicial test,
which can be unpredictable and implies litigation, a notoriously expensive
process that financially burdens most litigants, especially minority group
members who may be less able to finance it.281
As an alternative solution, one commentator has proposed a “reappropriation
use” defense as a new defense to trademark infringement.282 The reappropriation
defense would apply when a disparaging mark is registered and used in a
disparaging way, and a target group wanting to reclaim the mark could use the
mark for their own goods and defend against a claim of trademark infringement
by claiming reappropriation.283
This solution is distinct from this Comment’s proposed amendment in a
number of ways. As a preliminary matter, the defense operates within the
confines of current First Amendment jurisprudence, whereas the amendment
proposed here presumes a change in that jurisprudence, such as a hate speech
exception to First Amendment protection or the inclusion of hate speech in an
existing exception, like the fighting words or incitement exceptions.284
Additionally, the brief’s proposal concerns a post-registration defense to be
employed during litigation, as opposed to the amendment to the actual
registration process proposed here. Next, and most significantly, a
reappropriation defense, which is reactive in nature, would not prevent the
harmful effects of hate speech and would allow the registration of such speech

278

Id.
Id. at 17.
280
Id. at 19–20.
281
See, e.g., Tam, supra note 16, at 10 (explaining that had legal and other expert services not been
donated, Tam would not have continued the legal battle for The Slants’s registration).
282
Sohn, supra note 19, at 1758–59.
283
Id. at 1760.
284
See supra notes 248–52 and accompanying text.
279
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as trademarks to continue. Further, a reappropriation defense puts the onus on
individuals from marginalized groups to do the work of combatting hate speech
through reappropriation. In the trademark context, this means that, to confront
hateful trademarks, a minority-group member would have to create a
reappropriation mark, use it in commerce, and potentially meet other
requirements, depending on whether they pursued a registered or unregistered
mark. In doing so, those who are already burdened as the “traditional victims of
discrimination”285 must also assume the burden of acquiring and maintaining a
trademark in which they may have no interest. Thus, once again, those most
burdened by the tolerance of hate speech would be “the only ones taxed.”286
Under the solution proposed in this Comment, marks that constitute hate
speech would be barred from registration unless the applicant successfully
demonstrates that the mark is being used for reappropriation. This would stop
the spread of hate speech in the trademark context and also provide target group
members with the opportunity—if they so desired—to register marks that would
otherwise be considered hate speech in order to reclaim the term for their own
community and challenge the stereotype the hate speech had perpetuated.
D. A Response to Arguments Against a Hate Speech Exception to First
Amendment Protection
This section addresses several arguments against a hate speech exception to
the First Amendment, with a focus on how those arguments operate within the
context of trademark law, including (1) the “slippery slope” argument and (2)
the argument that the marketplace of ideas and the actual marketplace will
independently exclude hate speech.
1. The “Slippery Slope” Argument
The “slippery slope” argument that a prohibition on hate speech would lead
to government censorship is precisely the kind of selectively limited doctrinal
imagination that Matsuda critiques in her analysis of the lack of anti-hate speech
legislation in the United States.287 Matsuda highlights that “[t]his limited
imagination has not affected lawmakers faced with other forms of offensive
speech” or discrimination in other contexts in which the federal government has
recognized that “certain forms of expression are qualitatively different from the

285
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kind of speech deserving absolute protection.”288 For example, the remedies
available to victims of defamation acknowledge the potentially life-changing
consequences of defamation for its victims: “Their standing in the community,
their opportunities, their self-worth, their free enjoyment of life are limited.
Their political capital—their ability to speak and be heard—is diminished.”289
As Matsuda correctly concludes, for lawmakers to perceive these effects of
defamation, “and yet to fail to see that the very same things happen to the victims
of racist speech, is selective vision[,] . . . result[ing] in unequal application of
the law.”290
In the employment context, the federal government has demonstrated an
awareness of the negative effects of discrimination and harassment in the
workplace through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the policies of
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).291 Title VII
prohibits discrimination in hiring, firing, or other employment matters on the
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”292 Likewise, the EEOC’s
policy against discrimination and harassment provides that “[e]thnic slurs and
other verbal or physical conduct because of nationality are illegal if they are
severe or pervasive and create an intimidating, hostile or offensive working
environment, interfere with work performance, or negatively affect job
opportunities.”293 Such prohibitions indicate that there are certain modes of
expression—generally the use of language or displays of other behavior that
discriminate and promote hatred—which are intolerable in the workplace.294
Why then are such language and behavior permitted in other public spaces that
individuals must inhabit to participate in society and on the Principal Register
of federal trademarks?295 If such expression has the potential to create a hostile
work environment, which would negatively impact workers’ productivity and
prevent harmony in the workplace, why are measures not taken to restrict such
expression elsewhere and therefore promote social productivity and cohesion?
288

Id.
Id.
290
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291
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)–(m); IMMIGRANTS’ EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (2010), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
publications/immigrants-facts.cfm (referring to “Harassment Based on National Origin”).
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See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 291 (referring to “Harassment Based on National
Origin”). Moreover, “[e]xamples of potentially unlawful conduct include insults, taunting, or ethnic epithets,
such as making fun of a person’s foreign accent or comments like, ‘Go back to where you came from,’ whether
made by supervisors or by co-workers.” Id.
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Lee, supra note 19, at 2011.
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in the rolls of the Principal Register, as a matter of Free Speech.”).
289

CAREY_2.2.22

2022]

2/3/2022 10:22 AM

FREE SPEECH ABSOLUTISM IN TRADEMARK LAW

651

One possible, though ultimately unsatisfactory, answer lies in another argument
against a hate speech exception to First Amendment protection and, by
extension, the Lanham Act amendment proposed here: the marketplace
argument.
2. The Marketplace Argument
The marketplace argument draws on the ideas of John Stuart Mill, whose
nineteenth-century philosophy on free speech is still used by contemporary
commentators to support arguments in favor of an absolutist approach to the
First Amendment.296 In particular, the marketplace argument draws upon the
concept of the “marketplace of ideas,” in which false information is socially
parsed out through discourse and “truth” is revealed, with that truth becoming
the dominant and accepted doctrine in society.297 In other words, “the market
will decide whether an offensive idea or trademark can remain, survive, and
prevail.”298 In the trademark context, this marketplace argument becomes much
more concrete because of the visible evidence of what goods and services
consumers actually choose to purchase.299 Commentators in favor of the
absolutist interpretation, including Simon Tam himself, have used this reasoning
to respond to concerns about the registration of hateful marks, arguing that (1)
“consumers will refuse to buy goods or services with truly offensive marks and
. . . the offensive sellers will go out of business,”300 (2) the market is “the best
way to prevent any proliferation of distasteful trademark registrations,”301 and
(3) consumer activism will solve “[a]ny issues of indecency or harm that arise
from negative, derogatory trademarks or other hate speech.”302 However, despite
their prevalence, these arguments seem, at best, naïve and, at worst, ignorant of
the harms hate speech inflicts and the systemic racism it perpetuates.
For one thing, “[i]n today’s climate, businesses are happy to engage in
‘shock marketing’ tactics and cater to the lowest common denominator.”303
Additionally, as Professor Rebecca Tushnet notes, the marketplace argument
“does not deal with disparaging marks that target only subsets of the population;
296
Bradley, supra note 25, at 533 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 36 (Andrew UK Ltd. 2011)
(1859) (ebook)).
297
Id. at 533–34; see Lee, supra note 19, at 2015.
298
Lee, supra note 19, at 2015.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 2016 (citing Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration
and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 388 n.25 (2016)).
301
Tam, supra note 16, at 17.
302
MacKay, supra note 236, at 147.
303
Amicus Brief, supra note 119, at 20.
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a market can segment so that racists, or even people who just do not care about
harm to the target group, can support the trademark owner.”304
For another, though proponents of the marketplace argument may cite the
changing of many brand names in response to the Black Lives Matter movement
of the summer of 2020 as evidence of the marketplace snuffing out offensive
marks, it would be more accurate to view these changes as evidence of the
unpredictability and unreliability of the market as a controlling or protective
element. Many of the brands and companies that changed or announced the
intention to change their trademark names had existed, and in many cases, been
criticized for their insensitive marks long before 2020.305 The team formerly
known as the Washington Redskins, for example, had been the subject of
criticism and litigation since at least 1992 but did not change its name until
nearly thirty years later.306 Until the overwhelming show of support for the Black
Lives Matter movement in the midst of a global pandemic, brands had little
incentive to abandon racist trademarks that provided invaluable “familiarity and
recognition” in the marketplace and served their bottom lines.307 While this is a
reaction to the marketplace, this particular reaction is the result of a confluence
of unprecedented and traumatic events caused or highlighted by the coronavirus
pandemic: “We’re drawn to the media more than ever before, without work or
the daily distractions of life. This has been going on for decades, centuries even,
but we are literally and globally being forced to stop and watch injustice.”308
Should the United States have to wait for the next global pandemic to reevaluate
its racism?
CONCLUSION
When Justice Holmes articulated the “marketplace of ideas” concept in his
Abrams v. United States dissent, he laid the foundation for an absolutist
interpretation of freedom of speech that has characterized the Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence over the past century.309 That the truth will win out
through the market of ideas, he wrote, “is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
304

Tushnet, supra note 300, at 388 n.25.
Williams, supra note 8 (noting that, prior to 2020, “[i]n response to previous and frequent outcries over
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Jeong, supra note 13.
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Terry Nguyen, Aunt Jemima and the Long-Overdue Rebrand of Racist Stereotypes, VOX (June 17, 2020,
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Oats spokesperson’s remarks in 1989 on criticism of the ‘Aunt Jemima’ name and image).
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at the University of Maryland College).
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See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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experiment.”310 If that experiment ever successfully balanced freedom of
expression with freedom from discrimination, the arguments that it no longer
does so are persuasive. In its permissive approach to hate speech, the current
absolutist jurisprudence allows intolerance in the name of tolerance and
democracy and at the expense of both.311
As one article noted, “Charlottesville is not an anomaly. . . . It is a symptom
of a greater moral malady afflicting our nation”312—racism. The events of recent
years have demonstrated more strongly than ever that racism and hate speech
are “as American as apple pie,”313 and their roots in American history run even
deeper than the roots of an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment. For
the United States to meaningfully denounce racism, it must also “denounce and
restructure the systems”—like free speech absolutism—“that create [and
protect] the animus and ignorance that that ignite events like
[Charlottesville].”314 A federal prohibition on hate speech may be the first step
in that project, but—as this Comment has endeavored to show—it will be
important to reserve the right for marginalized groups to reclaim the words that
oppressed them and use those words to empower their communities if they wish
to do so. As The Slants demonstrated, trademark law is certainly one place where
minority groups can engage in the work of reappropriation and that should
remain the case.
As the law stands today, trademarks representing “the thought that we hate”
may be federally registered, but they are also “perpetuat[ing] stereotypes [and]
alienat[ing] members of American society along racial lines at a time of
heightened divisiveness.”315 In the trademark context, the marketplace cannot be
relied upon to exclude hateful speech, but areas of U.S., international, and
foreign law have been constructed to prevent and punish discriminatory behavior
without sliding down a slippery slope into unchecked government censorship.
The Lanham Act provides a framework to construct such law for federal
trademark registration to serve the government’s interest in securing
constitutional rights to all its citizens. While some argue that the solution to the
problem of hate speech is simply to allow more speech, “action speaks louder
than words. Action that identifies the democracy unequivocally with the exact
opposite goals of the racist, with the struggle of minorities for equality, is the
310
311
312
313
314
315
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real answer to hate speech.”316 If there is anything to be learned from the
evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence amidst the historical and social
upheavals of the twentieth century, it is that there is perhaps no better time than
now, in the midst of new upheavals, to take such action.
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